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German Council on Foreign Relations
Putin’s Proposal to 
Modify the Russian 
Constitution
Keep Succession Options Open  
and Increase Freedom to Maneuver
On January 20, 2020 – just days after 
his state-of-the nation speech followed 
by the surprising resignation of the 
Russian government and the appoint-
ment of a new prime minister – Presi-
dent Vladimir Putin submitted consti-
tutional changes to the State Duma, 
the lower house of parliament. They 
are likely to be approved there and then 
legitimized by a popular vote planned 
for April 2020. The amendments that 
Putin proposed reveal much about the 
future of Russia’s political system and 
Putin’s role in it.
President Vladimir Putin is re-ar-
ranging Russia’s governing system at 
remarkable speed. This pace pro-
vides the Kremlin with time to man-
age next year’s State Duma elections in 
the face of rising dissatisfaction among 
the electorate with socioeconom-
ic conditions throughout the coun-
try. The constitutional amendments 
he proposed in late January may allow 
Putin to stay in power beyond 2024, 
thus defusing the critical question of 
succession. Putin’s position and role 
within the system might change, but 
– because constitutional reform would 
allow him to keep several options open 
– it is too early to say how. The amend-
ments also include a proposal to give 
Russian constitutional order priority 
over international obligations. Germa-
ny and Europe should take note: these 
changes point to a transition by Russia 
into a more isolationist and self-reli-
ant nation that is moving further away 
from multilateralism and rule-based 
global order.
RESTRICTING THE 
PRESIDENCY AND 
FOREIGN INFLUENCE
One proposed amendment would 
ban any person from serving as pres-
ident of the Russian Federation for 
more than two terms by removing the 
phrase “in a row,” which had previ-
ously permitted Putin to return to the 
presidency after the single term of 
Dmitry Medvedev. The text also con-
firms six years as the length of the 
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presidential term. It is, however, still 
too early to conclude with absolute 
certainty that Putin will not continue 
to serve as president after his current 
term. Perhaps the ban on more than 
two terms will only come into effect 
after the modified constitution gets 
adopted, which could theoretically 
mean that Putin could remain in of-
fice for an additional two terms. Yet, 
there is also a chance that the ban will 
be implemented retroactively, which 
would exclude another candidacy 
by Putin.
Clearly, this amendment curtails eligi-
bility for the post of president consid-
erably. It states that only a person who 
neither holds nor has ever held citi-
zenship or any form of permanent res-
idence of another country can become 
president of the Russian Federation – 
though there is an exception for the 
Crimea. It also increases the span of 
time for which a candidate must con-
tinuously live in Russia before assum-
ing office from 10 to 25 years.
Consequently, the amendment could 
exclude key figures of the Russian op-
position who have lived abroad from 
running for the presidency – for ex-
ample, Alexei Navalny who studied at 
Yale University in 2010. This limita-
tion may also affect the intra-regime 
competition for the post as many of 
the system’s current strongmen have 
previously spent time abroad. This is 
particularly true for their children, 
some of whom may have had presiden-
tial ambitious, as many of them have 
been educated in the West.
The draft amendment also puts limita-
tions on members of the two chambers 
of parliament, members of the govern-
ment, leaders of many important state 
organizations, and judges. It bans all of 
them from holding a second citizen-
ship or a permanent residency permit 
of any country. In other words, if the 
amendment becomes law, everyone 
working in these positions will have to 
either resign their second citizenships 
and residence permits or their current 
jobs. With this move, the Kremlin ap-
parently intends to limit potential for-
eign influence on Russia.
STRENGTHENING  
THE PRESIDENT
While the draft legislation restricts 
eligibility for the presidency and 
other state positions, it simultaneous-
ly strengthens the formal power of the 
president over both the prime minister 
and parliament. One of the proposed 
amendments would allow the president 
to dismiss the prime minister without 
dismissing the whole government along 
with him or her. Also, the president 
would no longer need a prime minister 
to nominate anyone as deputy prime 
minister. Rather, the president would 
only require approval by the lower 
house of parliament – the State Duma – 
to appoint someone to this office. Both 
changes would allow for greater flexi-
bility in exercising presidential powers. 
The proposed amendment would give 
the upper house of Russian parliament 
– the Federation Council – a few ad-
ditional competences. For example, it 
would have the right to consult with 
the president about the appointment 
of leaders to various branches of the 
executive, including the heads of secu-
rity services. Another new competence 
would be the right to consult about the 
appointment of federal prosecutors. 
The current constitution only provides 
the Federation Council with the right 
to approve such appointments. None-
theless, these additional rights should 
in no way be equated with veto power.
Despite giving more power to the Fed-
eration Council, the draft legislation 
would not strengthen parliamentarism 
as a whole. In fact, the amendments 
preserve the president’s decisive influ-
ence over the upper house of parlia-
ment by continuing to allow him or her 
to appoint additional “representatives 
of the Russian Federation” to it. These 
representatives join the usual mem-
bers of the Federation Council – two 
from each unit of the federation (the 
so-called federative subjects), one of 
whom represents the elected, legisla-
tive power and the other of whom rep-
resents the executive branch. The only 
meaningful restriction on the repre-
sentatives appointed by the president 
is that their number cannot make up 
more than ten percent of the Coun-
cil. But together with the representa-
tives from the executive branch, they 
can easily uphold their stable majori-
ty in the Federation Council over the 
elected members. Aiming to maintain 
this leverage is probably an attempt by 
the Kremlin to mitigate the decreasing 
popularity of the ruling party United 
Russia, which was manifested in weak-
ened positions resulting from recent 
regional elections. 
It is too early to conclude that Putin 
will not continue to serve as  
president after his current term
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TURNING THE STATE 
COUNCIL INTO AN 
INSTRUMENT OF STATE 
POWER
At present, the State Council is an ex-
tra-constitutional, advisory body 
around the president without for-
mal powers. A new amendment would, 
however, make the State Council a 
constitutional body with a very general 
mandate and competences in the fields 
of state administration, domestic and 
foreign policy, social questions, and 
economics – which would be defined 
in a future federal law. The proposed 
legislation, therefore, could elevate the 
State Council to such an extent that it 
could affect the functions of all consti-
tutional structures. Hence, there is a 
real possibility that the State Council, 
which is currently composed of those 
trusted by Putin, will play an import-
ant role in the future system of pow-
er in Russia.
GIVING RUSSIAN LAW 
SUPREMACY OVER 
INTERNATIONAL 
OBLIGATIONS
Another proposed amendment would 
strengthen the supremacy of Russian 
law over international law and the de-
cisions of international organizations 
affecting Russia. Its text explicit-
ly states that decisions of interna-
tional organizations adopted on the 
basis of international treaties or on 
Russia’s membership in the given 
organization cannot be implement-
ed on the territory of the Russian Fed-
eration if they contradict the foun-
dation of Russia’s constitutional 
system. The decision on whether such 
a contradiction exists would have to 
be made by the Constitutional Court 
before a given international regula-
tion could be implemented. Although 
a federal law was passed in 2015 that 
already allows the Constitutional Court 
to consider whether decisions of inter-
national courts can be implemented in 
the country, the amendment would 
entrench supremacy of Russian law in 
the constitution.
This modification could have seri-
ous, long-term consequences for hu-
man rights and fundamental freedoms 
in Russia. Decisions of the Council of 
Europe – where Russia’s voting rights 
were restored last year – and the Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights will be 
much harder to implement there. If it 
also applies to decisions made by in-
ternational arbitrage, which is not 
clear from the text, it would gravely af-
fect foreign investors and the business 
climate in Russia.
The Kremlin’s trajectory is moving 
further away from Europe
This move suggests that the Kremlin’s 
trajectory is moving further away from 
Europe – calling the recent initiatives 
of French President Emmanuel Macron 
to repair EU relations with Russia fur-
ther into question.
CONTINUING POLITICAL 
TRANSITION
Importantly for Russia’s domestic con-
text, the amendments also address so-
cial issues that triggered a wave of pro-
tests across the Russian Federation in 
the past two years. The text introduces 
a minimum wage and an indexation of 
pensions connected to inflation.
Once the State Duma adopts the pro-
posed modifications to the constitu-
tion, they will be subject to an “all-Rus-
sian voting” likely slated for April 2020. 
The draft legislation does not, howev-
er, clarify what exactly an all-Russian 
voting entails and how it differs from 
a conventional referendum – add-
ing an element of uncertainty to the 
procedure.
All in all, if the proposal is approved in 
its current form, it will be a significant 
step by Russia to isolate itself even fur-
ther from the rule-based global order 
and to ramp up its process of political 
transition. While Putin has indeed in-
creased his freedom to maneuver with 
these constitutional amendments, they 
mark only one milestone in Russia’s 
transition process. Its end is not yet in 
sight, and all options are still open.
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